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"WITH MALICE TOWARD NONE": A SOLUTION TO AN
ILLINOIS HOMICIDE QUANDARY
TIMOTHY P. O'NEILL*
The scene is a tavern in Chicago on a sultry evening in June, 1981. Two
friends, Kane and Abel, begin to argue. Suddenly, the argument erupts
into a physical altercation. After ten minutes of intense fighting, Kane
strangles Abel, breaking the latter's neck. Soon thereafter, the police arrive
and arrest Kane. Abel is rushed to the hospital and placed in intensive care.
After he is booked, Kane calls his lawyer. Kane voices his concern about
the possibility of being charged with murder since he definitely intended
to kill Abel. His lawyer responds: "Don't worry about murder. There is
no question that your actions were performed under a sudden and intense
passion resulting from serious provocation. Such an action constitutes volun-
tary manslaughter,' which is a Class Two felony in Illinois.2 If you are
convicted, the worst you can get is seven years;3 with good time you'll
be out in three and one-half years.4 Moreover, because you have no prior
criminal record, there is a possibility you could even be given probation.",
An hour later, Kane's lawyer comes to visit him.
"I'm afraid I have some bad news."
"You mean Abel died?"
"No, the bad news is that Abel did not die."
* Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; A.B., Harvard University;
J.D., University of Michigan.
I. For the purposes of this Article, voluntary manslaughter is divided into two categories:
"provocation" voluntary manslaughter and "unreasonable belief" voluntary manslaughter. Pro-
vocation voluntary manslaughter is defined as an "unlawful killing committed while under a
sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
9-2(a) (1981). Serious provocation is conduct which is sufficient to excite an intense passion
in a reasonable person. Id. Unreasonable belief manslaughter is defined as an intentional or
knowing killing made under the unreasonable belief that circumstances were such that, if they
existed, would justify or exonerate the killing. Id. § 9-2(b). Both statutory provisions are set
forth infra at text accompanying notes 31-32.
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2(c) (1979) (amended January 1, 1982). Voluntary manslaughter
has since been made a Class One felony. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2(c) (1981).
3. The sentence for a Class Two felony shall be no less than 3 years and no more than
7 years. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(5) (1981). The sentence for a Class One felony
shall be no less than 4 years and no more than 15 years. Id. § 1005-8-1(a)(4).
4. Section 1003-6-3(a)(2) of the Illinois Revised Statutes provides that a prisoner shall receive
one day of good conduct credit for each day served in prison. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
1003-6-3(a)(2) (1981). This potentially reduces the period of incarceration set by the court by
one-half and applies to all felonies except those where a sentence of natural life has been im-
posed. Id.
5. Except where specifically prohibited by other provisions of the Illinois Criminal Code,
the court is to impose a sentence of probation upon an offender, unless after reviewing the
nature and circumstances of the offense, along with the history, character, and condition of
the offender, the court believes that imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public
or probation would deprecate the seriousness of the offense. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §
1005-6-1(a)(i)-(2) (1981).
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"I don't understand."
"If he had died, there is no question that you would have been charged
with voluntary manslaughter. He's alive, however, and there is no such
crime as attempt6 voluntary manslaughter in Illinois.' You admitted you
tried to kill Abel and that is attempt murder,' a Class X felony punishable
by up to thirty years in the penitentiary.9 Moreover, because it is a Class
X crime, there is no possibility of probation." Frankly, you made a terrible
mistake by not making sure that you actually killed Abel."
The above example illustrates a conceptual difficulty which has long
bedeviled Illinois homicide law. Ironically, the source of this confusion is
a legal term which continues to be used by Illinois courts despite the fact
that it was expressly removed from the Illinois criminal statutes over twenty
years ago. That term is "malice aforethought."
At common law, the presence of the element of malice aforethought' dis-
tinguished murder from manslaughter.' 2 Unfortunately, malice aforethought
is a legal term of art which bears no relation to the literal meaning of those
6. A person commits an attempt when "with intent to commit a specific offense, he does
any act which constitutes a substantial step towards the commission of that offense." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4(a) (1981).
7. See People v. Weeks, 86 Ill. App. 2d 480, 230 N.E.2d 12 (2d Dist. 1967). In Weeks,
the court held that the "sudden and intense passion" formulation of voluntary manslaughter,
see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2(a) (1981), was inconsistent with the intent required for at-
tempt offenses. 86 I1. App. 2d at 485, 230 N.E.2d at 14. For a further discussion of the
Weeks case, see infra notes 49-69 and accompanying text.
In a case of first impression, it was recently held that there could be no attempt under the
"unreasonable belief" formulation of voluntary manslaughter as well. People v. Reagan, 11
Ill. App. 3d 945, 444 N.E.2d 742 (3d Dist. 1982), leave to appeal allowed, No. 57914 (April
12, 1983). For a further discussion of the Reagan case, see infra note 69.
8. Attempt murder occurs when an actor performs an act which constitutes a substantial
step toward the commission of murder with the intent to kill. ILL. REV. STAT. §§ 8-4(a), 9-(a)(1)
(1981). See People v. Jones, 81 111. 2d 1, 8-9, 405 N.E.2d 343, 345-46 (1979); People v. Trinkle,
68 11. 2d 198, 201, 369 N.E.2d 888, 890 (1977). But see People v. Barker, 83 Il. 2d 319,
326-27, 415 N.E.2d 404, 407 (1980) (intent to commit murder is sufficient). See infra note 69.
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4(c)(1) (1981). The sentence for a Class X felony shall not
be less than 6 years nor more than 30 years. Id. § 1005-8-1(a)(3).
10. The Code provides that the court "shall sentence the offender to not less than the
minimum term of imprisonment." Id. § 1005-5-3(c)(2)(B) (1981). Thus, if found guilty, Kane
will be sentenced to a minimum of six years imprisonment.
I1. Malice aforethought has been defined as "an unjustifiable, inexcusable and unmitigated
person-endangering-state of mind." R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 75 (3d ed. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as PERKINS & BOYCE]. Person-endangering-states-of-mind include the intents
to kill or commit great bodily injury, to commit acts in wanton and willful disregard of
unreasonable risks of human injury, or to commit dangerous felonies. Id. at 73. For the statutory
definition of malice prior to its elimination from the Criminal Code in 1961, see infra notes
20-24 and accompanying text.
12. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 544 (1934).
See also People v. Pappas, 381 Ill. 90, 44 N.E.2d 896 (1942) (element that distinguishes murder
from manslaughter is malice); People v. Lewis, 375 IlI. 330, 31 N.E.2d 795 (1940) (same),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 628 (1941).
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two words. 3 Consequently, the use of this concept has obscured the true
relation between murder and manslaughter."
In an attempt to solve this problem, the drafters of the Illinois Criminal
Code of 1961 excised all reference to malice aforethought in all statutes deal-
ing with homicide.'" Nevertheless, the last twenty years of Illinois appellate
decisions illustrate that while old statutes may die, legal jargon rarely fades
away. Instead of embracing the demise of malice aforethought, Illinois courts
continue to use this term, further obfuscating an already murky area."
This Article examines several current problems in Illinois homicide law
resulting from the legal system's failure to understand the significance of
the elimination of the concept of malice aforethought. It is shown that Il-
linois courts continue to view voluntary manslaughter as "murder minus
malice aforethought," even though a far more helpful perspective-and one
consonant with the current statute-would recognize voluntary manslaughter
as simply being "murder plus extenuating circumstances." Moreover, this
Article contends that many of the difficulties plaguing Illinois trial judges
and juries in the field of voluntary manslaughter can be attributed to the
total failure of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (IPI)" to reflect the
profound changes in the relation between murder and voluntary manslaughter
brought about by the elimination of malice aforethought. Therefore, this
Article proposes a new instruction to remedy the problem.
ILLINOIS HOMICIDE LAW PRIOR TO THE CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961
Prior to the enactment of the 1961 Criminal Code,' 8 Illinois homicide law
strongly reflected common law.' 9 Section 358 of the previous Criminal Code
had defined murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with
13. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 11 at 57-58 (premeditation, in the sense of formulating
a plan or scheme, is an unnecessary part of the "aforethought" requirement; as long as malice
does not occur as an afterthought, the time interval between the idea and the act can be so
short as to render them almost simultaneous); Comment, Proposed Revisions in Illinois Criminal
Code, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 198, 212 (1953) (malice does not require a feeling of personal ill will
toward the victim; rather, an actual or implied intent to kill will suffice) [hereinafter cited as
Proposed Revisions].
14. See generally, W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, § 67, at 528-30
(3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE & SCOTT]. Accord infra notes 24-29 and accompany-
ing text.
15. Compare ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1 to 9-4 (1961) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 358, 363 (1959). See also People v. Davis, 35 111. 2d 55, 60, 219 N.E.2d 468, 471 (1966)
(in attempt to express crimes in simple language, draftsmen of the Criminal Code sought to
avoid any reference to malice aforethought).
16. For a list of recent cases insisting that malice is an essential element to be proven in
a murder case, see infra note 47.
17. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL (2d ed. 1981).
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1961).
19. For a summary of the common law development of murder, see L. HALL & S. GLUECK,
CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 37-39 (2d ed. 1958).
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malice aforethought, either express or implied." 2 Manslaughter, on the other
hand, was defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice,
express or implied, and without any mixture of deliberation whatever."'"
Express malice was defined as "the deliberate intention unlawfully to take
away the life of a fellow creature." 22 When no provocation appeared or
when the killing showed an abandoned or malignant heart, malice was
implied.23 Thus, through 1961, malice aforethought was treated by Illinois
courts as a necessary element of murder.2"
At early common law it was helpful to consider malice aforethought as
an element of murder because, at that time, the law recognized only one
type of murder-the unlawful killing of another with a premeditated intent
to kill.25 Malice aforethought succinctly described this state of mind. Yet
the concept of malice became confusing when the common law began to
recognize new types of murder not requiring a premeditated intent to kill,
while continuing to ascribe malice aforethought to each new kind. For
example, common law judges began to characterize unintentional killings com-
mitted in the course of a felony as murder.26 Similarly, an unintentional
killing resulting from conduct evincing a "depraved heart" constituted
murder.27 An unintentional killing caused by a person who was acting with
intent to do serious bodily injury was likewise found to be murder.2"
In all these situations, the actor lacked an express intent to kill. Never-
theless, the courts referred to these killings as "murder with malice
aforethought." 29 Consequently, rather than requiring that malice aforethought
be established in every murder, the reverse became true: any act found to
be murder was automatically endowed with the characteristic of malice
aforethought. What began as a descriptive phrase for a necessary element
of murder was reduced to a mere talisman.
HOMICIDE LAW UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961
The drafters of the Criminal Code of 1961 recognized the obsolescence
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 358 (1959) (emphasis added).
21. Id. § 361 (emphasis added). Furthermore, to be classified as manslaughter the killing
had to be "voluntary, upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provocation apparently
sufficient to make the passion irresistible, or involuntary in the commission of an unlawful
act, or a lawful act without due caution or circumspection." Id.
22. Id. § 358. This intention had to be manifested by external circumstances capable of
proof. Id.
23. Id.
24. See People v. Bush, 414 I1. 441, 111 N.E.2d 326 (1953); People v. Jones, 384 I1. 407,
51 N.E.2d 543 (1943); People v. Pappas, 381 Il1. 90, 444 N.E.2d 896 (1942); People v. Brown,
288 Ill. 489, 123 N.E. 515 (1919); People v. Curtright, 258 I1. 430, 101 N.E. 551 (1910).




29. The malice aforethought was found to be "implied," as distinguished from intentional
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of malice aforethought. The Committee Comments acknowledged that "[t]he
'malice aforethought' concept has undergone in Illinois the same reduction
to actual intent, regardless of the time available for deliberation, which it
has undergone elsewhere." 3 The Committee noted Illinois cases dating back
to 1872 which had held that the requirement of malice aforethought did
not prevent an intentional killing, preceded by only a short period of delibera-
tion, from being considered murder.3 '
The real obituary for malice aforethought in Illinois appeared in People
v. Slaughter,32 one of the last murder cases decided under the old law.
Although insisting that malice aforethought was a separate element which
must be proved in any murder prosecution, the Illinois Supreme Court pro-
ceeded to define it simply as any state of mind sufficient to constitute murder
under the statute. 3 It was obvious that malice aforethought had become
a rubber stamp mindlessly applied to every situation in which murder was
otherwise found to exist.
killings, where malice aforethought was "express". Id. For burden of proof problems concern-
ing implied malice, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
30. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979) Committee Comments-1961, at 16-17
(revised 1972). See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 217 (1977) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (finding that killing was committed with malice has come to mean simply that heat of
passion was absent).
31. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979) Committee Comments-1961, at 17
(revised 1972). The Committee, quoting Peri v. People, 65 Il. 17, 18 (1872), stated:
To constitute malice, it is not necessary that the party should brood over and meditate
upon the performance of the act for a considerable space of time; but it is suffi-
cient if it were deliberate and intentional, without apparently well founded danger
of great bodily harm, or where there is not such provocation as in law reduces
the homicide to manslaughter.
Id. at "23-24.
32. 29 Ill. 2d 384, 194 N.E.2d 193 (1963). In Slaughter, the defendant was convicted of
murdering his wife. Although maintaining that his wife's death was the result of an accident,
defendant changed his version of the shooting several times. The court determined the defen-
dant's failure to provide a credible explanation of the shooting, coupled with evidence of an
earlier threat by him against his wife's life, was sufficient to imply malice. Id. at 390-91, 194
N.E.2d at 196.
33. The Slaughter court stated that:
While it is beyond question that malice is an essential element of the crime of murder,
and equally certain that it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it is likewise
established that malice is implied where no considerable provocation appears or
when all of the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart. Hence, malice is implied from any deliberate or cruel act against another,
however sudden, and if a person uses a deadly weapon against another, resulting
in his death, it may be implied that the killing was malicious. It is not necessary,
to justify a conviction of murder, that the party charged may have brooded over
the intent to kill or that he entertained it for any considerable length of time, but
it is sufficient if, at the instant of the assault, he intended to kill the person assaulted,
or it will be enough if he is actuated in making the assault by that wanton and
reckless disregard of human life which denotes malice. And while required to be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, malice may be established by circumstantial
as well as direct evidence.
Id. at 389-90, 194 N.E.2d 195-96 (citations omitted).
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In response to the deterioration of malice aforethought, the Committee
eliminated any reference to it in the new Code. Instead, murder is now
defined:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits
murder if, in performing the acts which cause death:
(i) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual
or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual
or another; or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to that individual or another; or
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than voluntary
manslaughter."
In addition, voluntary manslaughter is no longer described merely as a
killing without malice aforethought, but rather:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits
voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under
a sudden and intense passion .... 31
(b) A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits
voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the cir-
cumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate
the killing . . . but his belief is unreasonable."
It is important to observe the symmetry between these new definitions
of murder and voluntary manslaughter. Putting aside felony murder,37 the
statute prescribes that a murder is committed when a person acts intentionally
or knowingly.3 These two states of mind mirror precisely those required
under unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter.39 Provocation
manslaughter, on the other hand, mentions no mental state. '0 Where a statute
does not prescribe a mental state, proof of intent, knowledge, or recklessness
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (1981).
35. Id. § 9-2(a).
36. Id. § 9-2(b). This unreasonable-use-of-force voluntary manslaughter was not recognized
prior to the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1961. See People v. Lockett, 82 111. 2d 546,
554-55, 413 N.E.2d 378, 383 (1980).
37. Under the felony murder rule, a person is guilty of murder if he kills an individual
during the attempt or commission of a forcible felony other than voluntary manslaughter. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(3) (1981). For a thorough discussion of the felony murder rule,
see PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 11, at 61-71. This Article's analysis is inapplicable to felony
murder.
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (1981). Under the Code, a person intends to accomplish
a certain result if "his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage
in that conduct." Id. § 4-4. A person acts with knowledge of the nature or attendant conse-
quences of his conduct when he is "consciously aware that his conduct is of such nature or
that such circumstances exist." Id. § 4-5(a). Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness
of the substantial probability that such fact exists. Id. "A person acts with knowledge of the
result of his conduct when he is consciously aware that such result is practically certain to
be caused by his conduct." Id. § 4-5(b).
39. Compare id. §§ 9-1(a)(l), (2) with id. § 9-2(b).
40. See id. § 9-2(a).
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generally is sufficient." Killings caused by recklessly performed acts, however,
come within the purview of involuntary manslaughter." Therefore, murder
and voluntary manslaughter require identical mental states-intent or
knowledge-as well as an identical result-the unjustified killing of a human
being. "
The significance of this symmetry lies in the fact that, prior to the 1961
Code, requiring proof of malice aforethought presumed that murder con-
tained a discrete mental element not present in manslaughter." This relation
may be expressed in the following syllogism:
1. If the elements of murder are proven, then, a fortiori, malice
exists.
2. Malice is not present in manslaughter.
3. Therefore, a finding that murder has been proven precludes a
finding of manslaughter.
Consequently, voluntary manslaughter could have been described as "murder
minus malice aforethought."
The elimination of malice aforethought from the Criminal Code, however,
greatly simplifies the murder/voluntary manslaughter dichotomy. Under the
prior law, a finding of murder foreclosed the possibility of manslaughter.
Implicit in a finding of murder was a finding of malice aforethought, and
therefore the homicide could not have been manslaughter. Under the new
law, however, voluntary manslaughter can be proved only if all the elements
of murder are proved. Like murder, voluntary manslaughter involves an un-
justified homicide performed intentionally or knowingly'. Unlike murder,
voluntary manslaughter contains mitigating circumstances. With the elimina-
tion of malice aforethought, voluntary manslaughter has become "murder
plus extenuating circumstances." Consequently, murder and voluntary
manslaughter no longer need to be viewed as different crimes. Instead, they
should be characterized as different degrees of the same crime-an unjustified
killing performed intentionally or knowingly. 5
41. Id. § 4-3(b). This rule does not apply to offenses which involve absolute liability. Id.
42. Illinois defines involuntary manslaughter as an unintentional killing where the acts which
cause the death are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and those
acts are performed recklessly. Id. § 9-3. A person acts recklessly when he "consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow .. .
and such failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable
person would exercise in the situation." Id. § 4-6.
43. It must be emphasized that the felony murder theory is not subject to this analysis.
Even accidental homicides may constitute murder under this theory. The only requisite intent
is the defendant's intent to commit the underlying felony. See People v. Jeffrey, 94 Il. App.
3d 455, 460, 418 N.E.2d 880, 885-86 (5th Dist. 1981); People v. Miner, 46 Il. App. 3d 273,
282, 360 N.E.2d 1141, 1148 (5th Dist. 1977).
44. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
45. Professor Perkins, a staunch supporter of the use of malice aforethought, contends
that it is a useful concept if properly understood. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 11, at 73-75.
He defines it as "an unjustifiable, inexcusable and unmitigated person-endangering-state-of-
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IMPACT OF THE ELIMINATION OF "MALICE AFORETHOUGHT" ON ILLINOIS COURTS
Few Illinois decisions have expressly recognized that malice aforethought
is no longer an element of murder in Illinois." Moreover, a considerable
number of cases have continued to discuss murder in terms of malice
aforethought. 7 In short, it is apparent that the elimination of malice
aforethought by the Illinois legislature has had little effect on the day-to-
day workings of the judiciary.
One commentator discussing the meaning of "malice" and "aforethought"
stated that "[it] is impossible to establish empirically that the use of [malice
aforethought] has resulted in either injustice to defendants or the subversion
of state policy . , "8 If this were true, the retention or demise of malice
aforethought would be merely of academic interest. Unfortunately, several
homicide problems currently facing Illinois courts can be resolved only if
courts consistently acknowledge that malice aforethought is no longer an
element of murder in Illinois.
mind." Id. at 75. But note the two discrete mental elements running through this allegedly
unified state of mind. First, it concerns what the defendant wishes to do to the victim; that
is, perform a "person-endangering" act. Second, it concerns why he is acting in such a manner;
that is, it is concerned with the possibility of justification, excuse, or mitigation. These are
two very different concerns. Malice aforethought is thus a particularly clumsy element to in-
clude in murder because it forces the state to prove not only the effects intended by the actor
vis-a-vis the victim (the "what" prong), but also to prove that the acts were unlawful, un-
justifiable, inexcusable, and accompanied by no mitigating circumstances (the "why" prong).
Perkins's contention that the prosecution is aided by the presumption that every homicide has
been committed with malice aforethought only makes the concept seem even more irrelevant.
Id. at 77.
The Illinois Criminal Code simplifies homicide by defining unlawful killings as murder when
accompanied by a specific state of mind vis-a-vis the victim. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(1981).
Section 9-2 then sets forth those mitigating circumstances which will reduce those unlawful
killings to voluntary manslaughter. The finder of fact need not consider these mitigating cir-
cumstances unless there is some evidence introduced at trial which, if believed, would reduce
the crime to voluntary manslaughter. People v. Lockett, 82 Ill. 2d 546, 550, 413 N.E.2d 378,
381 (1980).
46. See People v. Lowe, 122 Ill. App. 2d 197, 208-09, 258 N.E.2d 370, 376 (4th Dist. 1970)
(Illinois Supreme Court has stated its approval of definitions of homicide which avoid the common
law language of malice aforethought); People v. Ruel, 120 Ill. App. 2d 374, 380, 256 N.E.2d
672, 675 (2d Dist. 1970) (under Illinois statute, actual malice need not be proven). But see
People v. Davis, 35 Ill. 2d 55, 60, 219 N.E.2d 468, 471 (1966) (although court acknowledged
change, it proceeded to discuss murder instruction in terms of implied malice).
47. A number of recent cases have held that proof of malice is an essential element in
a murder case. See People v. Barney, Ill Ill. App. 3d 669, 676, 444 N.E.2d 518, 523 (1st
Dist. 1982); People v. Evans, 92 Il. App. 3d 874, 879, 416 N.E.2d 377, 380 (2d Dist. 1981);
People v. Cowen, 68 Il. App. 3d 437,* 441, 386 N.E.2d 435, 438 (1st Dist. 1979); People v.
Tiller, 61 Ill. App. 3d 785, 794, 378 N.E.2d 282, 290 (51h Dist. 1978); People v. McCord,
46 Il. App. 3d 389, 392, 361 N.E.2d 13, 17 (1st Dist. 1977); People v. Walden, 43 111. App.
3d 744, 752, 357 N.E.2d 232, 239 (1st Dist. 1976); People v. Muldrow, 30 Ill. App. 3d 209,
217, 332 N.E.2d 664, 669 (lst Dist. 1971).
Similarly, several cases have defined murder in terms of malice. See, e.g., People v. Forrest,
133 Ill. App. 2d 70, 72, 272 N.E.2d 813, 815 (1st Dist. 1971); People v. Spagnola, 123 II1.
App. 2d 171, 186, 260 N.E.2d 20, 27 (1st Dist. 1970).
48. Proposed Revisions, supra note 13, at 213.
WITH MALICE TOWARD NONE
Problem One.- Is There Such a Crime as "Attempt Voluntary Manslaughter?"
As the scenario at the beginning of this Article illustrates, Illinois does
not recognize attempt voluntary manslaughter as a crime. The leading case
in this area, People v. Weeks, 9 merits some discussion.
Michael Weeks and his wife separated in March, 1966. During the next
few months Weeks made repeated efforts to reconcile his marriage. On May
1 1th he discovered his wife with a man named Omar Joel. Following a
sleepless night and a half-day of work, Weeks purchased a .22 caliber
revolver. After informing a service station attendant that he was "going to
the gas chamber," Weeks went to his wife's residence and told her that Joel
soon would be dead.50
Weeks-a man apparently not given to subtlety-then proceeded to Joel's
apartment, pointed the gun at him, and asked "[Hiow would you like to
die?" The two began to struggle and Joel was siot in the shoulder. When
Weeks saw blood, he dropped his gun and helped take Joel downstairs to
transport him to the hospital. The police, alerted by Weeks' father-in-law,
apprehended Weeks outside Joel's apartment.'
Weeks was tried on three counts: two counts of attempt murder and one
count of attempt voluntary manslaughter based upon a sudden and intense
passion.2 The jury returned a verdict of guilty only on the latter charge.
Weeks appealed his conviction, contending that an attempt must involve
a specific intent to commit a crime. Asserting that voluntary manslaughter
based upon a sudden and intense passion can exist only when there is no
such specific intention, Weeks maintained that an attempt to commit volun-
tary manslaughter was a logical and legal impossibility. Accepting this argu-
ment, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed Weeks' conviction.
Noting that this was a case of first impression in Illinois, the Weeks court
looked to Moore v. People,53 an 1893 Illinois Supreme Court case found
to be applicable by analogy. Moore involved a statute which made it a crime
to perpetrate "an assault with intent to commit murder, rape, mayhem, rob-
bery, larceny, or other felony." 5 At issue in Moore was whether this statute
could support a conviction for assault with intent to commit manslaughter.
In a brief opinion, the court noted that all the felonies enumerated in the
statute required deliberation or premeditation.5 Additionally, manslaughter
was defined as the "unlawful killing of a human being without malice, express
49. 86 Ill. App. 2d 480, 230 N.E.2d 12 (2d Dist. 1967).
50. Id. at 482, 230 N.E.2d at 13.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 481, 230 N.E.2d at 12.
53. 146 Ill. 600, 35 N.E. 166 (1893). In addition to relying on Moore, the Weeks court
looked to several New York decisions which had concluded that there is no attempt manslaughter
in New York. See People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150, 225 N.E.2d 200, 278 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1967);
People v. Brown, 21 A.D.2d 738, 249 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1964). The New York decisions were
not applicable to the Weeks court's analysis, however, because the New York manslaughter
statute applied in those cases provided that manslaughter could be committed with no intent.
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 23 (1891).
55. 146 Ill. at 602, 35 N.E. at 166.
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or implied, and without any mixture of deliberation whatever." '5 6 Because
the crime in question required intent to commit a felony involving delibera-
tion, the court reasoned it would be a contradiction to say that one could
have intended to commit a crime which by definition includes no delibera-
tion. Therefore, the Moore court held that an individual could not be con-
victed of an assault with intent to commit manslaughter. 7 The existence of
any intent to take life would make the act an assault with intent to murder."
Applying the reasoning set forth in Moore, the Weeks court maintained
that an act which constitutes an attempt must result from some calculation
concerning the act. 9 The nature of provocation voluntary manslaughter,
however, precludes any calculation. 6' Because an act cannot be both the result
of a sudden and intense passion and calculation, the Weeks court concluded
that there could be no attempt voluntary manslaughter."
The Moore decision evolved from the traditional view that manslaughter
lacks an element that murder possesses, namely, malice aforethought.6 2 Sec-
tion 140 of the Criminal Code defined express malice as the "deliberate in-
tention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature." ' 63 By equating
absence of malice with absence of premeditated, deliberate intent to kill,
the Moore court reasoned that one could not deliberately intend to commit
manslaughter because it is an offense motivated by irresistible passion-an
offense not involving premeditation or deliberation.6 4 In other words, one
could not deliberately intend to commit a crime which, by definition, could
not be committed with a deliberate intent.
The dichotomy drawn between murder and manslaughter by the Moore
court was inspired by the concept of malice aforethought. The court's
analysis, however, was flawed. In determining whether one could intend to
commit manslaughter, the inquiry should not have been whether one could
deliberately intend to commit the crime of manslaughter per se. Rather, in
keeping within the definition of manslaughter, the court should have asked
whether one could intend to kill under circumstances negating deliberation,
thus rendering the intent non-malicious and reducing the crime from murder
to manslaughter.6  Engaging in an analysis involving malice aforethought,
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 143 (1891).
57. 146 Ill. at 602, 35 N.E. at 167.
58. Id. See infra note 65.
59. 86 Ill. App. 2d at 485, 230 N.E.2d at 14 (1967).
60. Id.
61. /d.
62. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 140 (1891).
64. 146 Il. 600, 602, 35 N.E. 166, 167 (1893).
65. This should not have been a novel idea to the Moore court. Ironically, on the very
same day the Moore decision was filed in Springfield, the Illinois Supreme Court sitting in
Mount Vernon declared "[m]alicious intent is a necessary element of the crime of assault with
intent to commit murder, for if the killing would have been less than murder, if death had
resulted, the act cannot be deemed an assault with intent to commit murder." Friederich v.
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however, encouraged viewing murder and manslaughter as two totally dif-
ferent crimes rather than as two degrees of the same basic crime-the un-
justified killing of a human being performed with knowledge or intent.
By relying on Moore, the Weeks court ignored the fact that malice
aforethought had been eliminated from Illinois law several years earlier. 6
The change was more than cosmetic. Specifically, murder no longer possessed
an element which provocation manslaughter did not. Therefore, voluntary
manslaughter was no longer to be considered as murder minus malice, but
rather murder plus extenuating circumstances. Voluntary manslaughter in-
corporated the entire physical act and intent of murder, but possessed
something more-namely, mitigating circumstances. In other words, murder
and voluntary manslaughter merely occupied different locations on the
homicide continuum.
The elimination of the malice terminology makes it easier to determine
whether there can be attempt voluntary manslaughter. The question of
whether one can attempt or deliberately intend to commit an offense under
sudden passion is simply irrelevant. Because voluntary manslaughter can be
viewed as "murder plus extenuating circumstances," attempt voluntary man-
slaughter simply means "attempt murder plus extenuating circumstances."
The above interpretation solves the riddle posed by the opening scenario
of this Article in which one acting under sudden passion is punished more
severely if his victim lives rather than dies. In this situation, Kane should
have been charged with attempt voluntary manslaughter rather than attempt
murder. Although Kane attempted murder, his actions resulted from serious
provocation and thereby constituted attempt voluntary manslaughter. View-
ing murder and manslaughter as merely different degrees of the same crime-
an approach discouraged by the malice aforethought distinction-solves the
problem and yields a more logical and just result.
The Weeks court's holding that there can be no attempt voluntary
manslaughter in Illinois67 has been criticized by legal commentators. 8 Despite
People, 147 Ill. 310, 315, 35 N.E. 472, 473 (1893) (emphasis added). This language suggests
that assault with intent to commit manslaughter is indeed a crime.
Several years later, the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized that the sudden passion of
manslaughter did not mean the actor lacked an intent to kill, but such passion merely mitigated
the gravity of his crime. Hammond v. People, 199 Ill. 173, 180, 64 N.E. 980, 982 (1902).
Neither Friederich nor Hammond were cited by the Weeks court.
66. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
67. 86 Ill. App. 2d 480, 230 N.E.2d 12 (2d Dist. 1967). It should be noted that the narrow
result reached by the Weeks court-that Weeks was not guilty of attempt voluntary
manslaughter-was probably correct. Based on the facts, it appears that a struggle occurred
once Weeks pointed the gun at Joel. It could be argued that Weeks merely possessed a reckless
state of mind, insufficient for a finding of voluntary manslaughter. Thus, the Weeks court
could have achieved the same result had it decided this case narrowly on the evidence presented
rather than the broad basis it chose.
68. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 14, at 430 0.86 (Weeks court was in error in main-
taining that because voluntary manslaughter can result only from serious provocation, it can-
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this criticism, Weeks continues to be followed in Illinois.69 Malice
aforethought thus continues its maddening hold on the Illinois judicial mind.
Problem Two: Instructing the Jury on "Provocation"
Voluntary Manslaughter- "Did I Confuse You?"
Although the term malice aforethought has been expressly removed from
the Illinois homicide statutes, the malady lingers. Consider the plight of the
not be committed with intent to kill); Sachs, Is Attempt to Commit Voluntary Manslaughter
a Possible Crime?, 71 ILL. BAR. J. 166 (1982) (Weeks rule that there cannot be attempt pro-
vocation voluntary manslaughter is not logically or legally persuasive, and has been rejected
in most other states).
69. See People v. Gibson, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 425 N.E.2d 1208 (1st Dist. 1981); People
v. Rodriguez, 96 111. App. 3d 431, 421 N.E.2d 323 (Ist Dist. 1981); People v. Hill, 53 I11.
App. 3d 280, 368 N.E.2d 714 (1st Dist. 1977); People ex rel. Bassin v. Israel, 31 Ill. App.
3d 744, 335 N.E.2d 53 (5th Dist. 1975); People v. Ross, 103 I1. App. 2d 430, 243 N.E.2d
697 (Ist Dist. 1968).
Recently, the Third District squarely faced the issue of whether there can be a crime of
attempt voluntary manslaughter based on "unreasonable belief." The court in People v. Reagan,
Ill Ill. App. 3d 945, 444 N.E.2d 742 (3d Dist. 1982), leave to appeal allowed, No. 57914
(April 12, 1983), held that such an offense was a legal impossibility. The Reagan court is clear-
ly wrong; the analysis used for "provocation" attempt voluntary manslaughter is equally ap-
plicable to "unreasonable belief" voluntary manslaughter.
In Reagan, the State argued that the only intent necessary for attempt voluntary manslaughter
was an intent to kill. The Reagan court, citing dictum from People v. Barker, 83 IIl. 2d 319,
415 N.E.2d 404 (1980), stated that an intent to kill was per se insufficient to prove attempt
murder because such an intent was not necessarily unlawful. The Reagan court held that the
intent necessary for attempt murder was a "specific intent to kill without lawful justification."
Ill 111. App. 3d at 950-51, 444 N.E.2d at 745. Thus, the court asserted that the intent needed
to commit attempt voluntary manslaughter was a "specific intent to kill with unreasonable
belief in the need to use deadly force in self defense." 111 III. App. 3d at 951, 444 N.E.2d
at 746. Finding this to be a legal impossibility, the Reagan court determined that there could
be no offense of attempt voluntary manslaughter based on the "unreasonable belief" theory.
The Reagan court's suggestion that attempt murder requires a "specific intent to kill without
lawful justification" is erroneous. Consider a defendant who sincerely believes it is justified
to kill people with blue eyes. He shoots the first blue-eyed person he sees, fully intending to
kill him. Fortunately, the victim does not die. According to the Reagan court, this is not at-
tempt murder because that crime requires a "specific intent to kill without lawful justifica-
tion," and here the defendant had no intention to kill unjustifiably. This is preposterous.
An intent to kill is the only mental state necessary for either attempt murder or attempt
voluntary manslaughter. The reason for this can best be explained in the following schema:
1. If defendant acts with an intent to kill and the victim lives, defendant may
be guilty of attempt murder, attempt voluntary manslaughter, or neither offense.
2A. Defendant's act can be justified only if one of-the statutory justifications
in Article 7 of the Criminal Code is objectively present-that is, if it actually exists
or a reasonable person could believe, under the circumstances, that it exists. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 7-1 to 7-14 (1981). If none of these justifications is objec-
tively present, defendant is guilty of attempt murder without any further inquiry
concerning defendant's mental state. Thus, simple intent to kill will support an
attempt murder conviction. See People v. Barker, 83 111. 2d 319, 334, 415 N.E.2d
404, 411 (1980) (Moran, J., dissenting).
2B. If one of the statutory justifications is objectively present, then it is necessary
to inquire whether defendant subjectively believed he was thus justified. If he did
not possess this subjective belief, he is guilty of attempt murder. Proceed to Part 3.
1983] WITH MALICE TO WARD NONE 119
trial judge instructing a jury on murder and provocation voluntary
manslaughter. In People v. Pastorino,0 the jury was instructed on murder,
provocation voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated battery. The trial judge
further advised the jury that it should consider voluntary manslaughter only
if the defendant was first found not guilty of murder.7
2C. If one of the statutory justifications is objectively present, and if, and only
if, defendant also subjectively believed he was thus justified, then defendant is not
guilty of either attempt murder or attempt voluntary manslaughter. This ends the
inquiry.
3A. If defendant is guilty of attempt murder, it must then be determined if "serious
provocation" objectively existed. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2(a) 141981). If it did
not objectively exist, defendant is guilty of attempt murder without any further
inquiry into the defendant's mental state.
If serious provocation did objectively exist, however, it is necessary to inquire
into defendant's subjective state of mind. If he did not act under a "sudden and
intense passion," he is still guilty of attempt murder. If, and only if, he is seriously
provoked and he acted under a sudden and intense passion, he is guilty of attempt
voluntary manslaughter under the "provocation" theory. The mitigating circumstances
make this a less culpable form of attempt murder, that is, attempt voluntary
manslaughter.
3B. If defendant is guilty of attempt murder and the "provocation" theory of
attempt voluntary manslaughter is inapplicable, it is necessary to inquire whether
defendant nevertheless believed himself to be justified in his actions. If he had no
such belief, he is guilty of attempt murder and the inquiry is over.
If defendant did have such a belief, the analysis must continue. Recall that defen-
dant at this point is guilty of attempt murder-no Article 7 justification existed
nor could a reasonable man have believed one to exist. Thus, defendant's belief
is per se unreasonable. The issue then is whether the way in which defendant
unreasonably perceived the circumstances would have constituted justification under
Article 7. If defendant's perception of the situation was included in Article 7 (e.g.,
he unreasonably believed he was being attacked with deadly force), he is guilty
of attempt voluntary manslaughter. If defendant's perception would not constitute
Article 7 justification (e.g., he believed he could justifiably kill people with blue
eyes), he is guilty of attempt murder.
The Illinois Supreme Court, by agreeing to review Reagan, has a valuable opportunity to
correct its erroneous rulings in Moore and Barker.
70. 90 I11. App. 3d 921, 414 N.E.2d 54 (1st Dist. 1980), rev'd, 91 111. 2d 178, 435 N.E.2d
1145 (1982).
71. The confusion in this area is eloquently borne out by the trial judge's additional comments:
I will go back and explain this to you in a very slow manner so you won't get
confused. . . . [Y]ou have a voluntary manslaughter and you have a murder. An
individual cannot be guilty of both of them, so what you will have to do is con-
sider the murder verdict. When you have reached your verdict as far as the murder
is concerned, it's either guilty or not guilty. If you find the defendant not guilty
of murder, you may-you do not have to do anything else. If you find her guilty
of murder, then you don't have to consider the voluntary manslaughter because
you have already found her guilty of murder. So, you will come back just with
the guilty of murder filled out.
If you find her not guilty of murder, then you will consider the voluntary
manslaughter. If you consider the voluntary manslaughter, then you will have to
come back with guilty of voluntary manslaughter or not guilty of voluntary
manslaughter. In other words, you may come back with two verdicts filled out
or with three verdicts filled out.
. . . [Niow between the murder count, if you find her not guilty of murder,
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On appeal, defendant argued that the judge's comments directing the jury
to consider murder before manslaughter nullified, or at least deemphasized,
the voluntary manslaughter instruction.72 Accepting this argument, the ap-
pellate court described the situation as "analogous to one in which the judge
failed to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. ' 73 The court reason-
ed that the judge's comments effectively removed from the jury the necessary
element of choice,7" thereby depriving defendant of her right to have the
jury choose between murder and voluntary manslaughter. 5 The Illinois
Supreme Court subsequently reversed without discussing the propriety of the
judge's comments, holding that any issue concerning the instructions had
been waived due to defense counsel's lack of timely objection.76 The dis-
sent, however, maintained that the comments served to circumscribe the jury's
right to choose which offense, if any, defendant had committed. 7 This, the
dissent asserted, resulted in a substantial defect which was not waived by
failure to object."
Notwithstanding the validity of the dissent's remarks, the vague talk of
deemphasis and circumscribing the jury's choice fails to articulate the true
reason why the instructions were objectionable. Observe that the trial judge
told the jury, "If you find her guilty of murder, then you don't have to
consider the voluntary manslaughter because you have already found her
guilty of murder."'" Implicit in this language is the syllogism discussed
earlier-a finding that the defendant is guilty of murder includes a finding
then you do not consider voluntary manslaughter. And if you find her not guilty
of murder, then you must consider voluntary manslaughter, guilty or not guilty.
Did I confuse you or did you understand that?
All right. During the course of deliberations, if you get a little confused on it,
send a note out to the deputy that you need clarification. That's basically what
it is. Okay. You come back either with two verdicts filled out or three verdicts.
If you find her not guilty on everything, of course you come back with three. If
you find her guilty or not guilty on the aggravated battery, of course not guilty
or guilty on the murder. Of course, if you find her guilty of murder, then you
do not consider voluntary manslaughter. Okay.
91 Ill. 2d 178, 186-87, 435 N.E.2d 1144, 1148-49 (1982) (emphasis added).
72. 90 Ill. App. 3d 921, 925, 414 N.E.2d 54, 58 (1st Dist. 1980).
73. Id.
74. When evidence that would support both a murder verdict and a verdict of voluntary
manslaughter is presented, the jury must be allowed to choose which crime actually was disclosed
by the evidence. See, e.g., People v. Canada, 26 II1. 2d 491, 491-92, 187 N.E.2d 243, 243
(1962) (refusal to give manslaughter instruction in murder prosecution where evidence would
permit jury to return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter rather than murder constitutes reversi-
ble error); People v. Pappas, 381 111. 90, 94, 44 N.E.2d 896, 898 (1942) (it is province of
jury to determine whether accused is guilty of murder or manslaughter if there is any evidence
which tends to prove the lesser rather than the greater offense).
75. 90 111. App. 3d at 925, 414 N.E.2d at 58.
76. 91 Ill. 2d 178, 188, 435 N.E.2d 1145, 1149 (1982).
77. Id. at 194, 435 N.E,2d at 1152 (Goldenhersh & Simon, JJ., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. See supra note 71.
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of malice and this automatically precludes a finding of manslaughter."
Analysis of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, however, demonstrates that
this logic is fallacious.
Assuming felony murder is not involved, a comparison of the revised IPI
jury instructions for murder8' and voluntary manslaughter 2 reaffirms the
argument that provocation manslaughter should be viewed as simply murder
plus extenuating circumstances. 3 With the abolition of malice aforethought,
80. For a discussion of this syllogism, see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
81. The issues instruction for murder provides:
To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of
_; and
Second: That when the defendant did so,
[1] he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to _ ; or
[2] he knew that his act would cause death or great bodily harm to __ ;
or
[31 he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to _ ;
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these
propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defen-
dant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these
propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the
defendant not guilty.
ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL No. 7.02 (2d ed. 1981).
82. The issues instruction for provocation voluntary manslaughter provides:
To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the State must prove the following
propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of
__; and
Second: That when the defendant did so,
[1] he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to __ ; or
[2] he knew that such acts would cause death or great bodily harm to
___; or
[3] he knew that such acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to _ ; and
Third: That when the defendant did so,
[I] he acted under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious pro-
vocation by another; or
[2] he acted under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious pro-
vocation by some other person he endeavored to kill, but he negligently
or accidentally killed _.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these
propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defen-
dant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these
propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the
defendant not guilty.
Id. No. 7.04.
83. For a discussion of this concept, see supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. It should
be noted that this idea applies to both provocation manslaughter and unreasonable belief
manslaughter. The application of this concept to unreasonable belief manslaughter is further
developed infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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the acts and basic mental state of both crimes are identical."' Thus, a find-
ing that the State has proved the elements of murder should begin, rather
than preclude, the jury's consideration of provocation voluntary
manslaughter. After finding the elements of murder to be satisfied, the jury
should then determine whether the extenuating circumstances of provoca-
tion voluntary manslaughter exist. The error in the Pastorino instruction is
that it prevents the conscientious jury from considering a verdict of volun-
tary manslaughter in cases where every element of that crime is present. If
the Pastorino jury had followed the judge's instructions scrupulously, it would
have returned a verdict of guilty on the murder charge without ever con-
sidering the issue of whether any evidence of mitigating circumstances was
presented at trial.
As a postscript to the plight of the trial judge in Pastorino, there would
have been no need for him to offer his impromptu oral instruction had the
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions been adequate. Unfortunately, the Pattern
Instructions provide insufficient guidance to a jury faced with verdict forms
for both murder and provocation voluntary manslaughter. Instead of the
separate instructions now provided for in the IPI, a unified instruction should
be adopted stressing the relationship between the two offenses. The follow-
ing jury instruction would provide guidance for a jury faced with a decision
of whether a defendant was guilty of murder, provocation voluntary
manslaughter, or neither:
In considering the charges of murder and voluntary manslaughter,
you should examine each of the following propositions:
One: That the defendant performed the acts which caused
the death of __ ; and
Two: That when the defendant did so, he intended to kill
or do great bodily harm to __ ; or he knew that his act
would cause death or great bodily harm to _ ; or he
knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to _ ; and
Three: That when the defendant did so,
[A] That the defendant was acting under a sudden and in-
tense passion resulting from serious provocation by another;
or
[B] That the defendant was acting under a sudden and in-
tense passion resulting from serious provocation by some
other person he endeavored to kill, but he negligently or
accidentally killed __.
If you should find from your consideration of all the evidence
that the State has proved all three of these propositions beyond
84. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. Note that this argument does not apply
to felony murder.
85. In an unreasonable belief manslaughter case, the instruction should read:
Three: That the defendant was not justified in using the force he used; and
Four: That when the defendant did so, he believed that circumstances existed which
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a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty of volun-
tary manslaughter.
If you should find from your consideration of all the evidence
that the State has proved only Propositions One and Two beyond
a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty of murder.
If you should find from your consideration of all the evidence
that the State has failed to prove either of the first two proposi-
tions beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant
not guilty of either offense.8 6
The use of such an instruction would eliminate the problem of whether
the jury first should consider murder or voluntary manslaughter. Instead,
the instruction orders the jury to consider all of the evidence before deciding
whether murder, voluntary manslaughter, or neither has been proven. The
failure to include such an instruction in the current pattern jury instructions
leads to a troublesome result: it is possible for a jury to return a guilty
verdict for both voluntary manslaughter and murder.
Problem Three: A Verdict of "Guilty of Murder" and
"Guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter"
Consider a murder trial in which the jury is instructed on both murder
and unreasonable belief manslaughter. Under the newly revised Illinois Pat-
tern Jury Instructions,87 the jury would be directed as follows:
would have justified killing - but that defendant's belief that such circumstances
existed was unreasonable.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the State has proved
all four of these propositions beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defend-
ant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
If you should find from your consideration of all the evidence that the State
has proved only Propositions One, Two and Three beyond a reasonable doubt,
you should find the defendant guilty of murder.
If you should find from your consideration of all the evidence that the State
has failed to prove any of the first three propositions beyond a reasonable doubt,
you should find the defendant not guilty of either offense.
It should be noted that in Illinois, whenever there is an instruction on self-defense, there
also must be an instruction on unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter, and vice versa.
People v. Lockett, 82 Ill. 2d 546, 552, 413 N.E.2d 378, 381 (1980).
86. Although criticism of the burden of proof used for voluntary manslaughter in Illinois
is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that there are problems with the current
scheme. Currently, a defendant cannot be convicted of voluntary manslaughter unless the State
proves all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Consider the situation in which a defendant
is charged with murder and the State concerns itself solely with proving that he is guilty of
murder. Defendant, however, presents sufficient evidence of mitigation to justify an instruction
on voluntary manslaughter as well. The conscientious jury will note that it can return a verdict
of guilty of voluntary manslaughter only if the State has proved mitigation beyond a reasonable
doubt. See ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL Nos. 7.04, 7.06 (2d ed. 1981).
Because the State in the above scenerio has produced no such evidence, the jury would be
precluded from finding the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Changes in this area
should come from the legislature.
87. The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions were revised in 1981.
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To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the following
propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death
of _ ; and
Second: That when the defendant did so, he intended to kill or
do great bodily harm to __ ; or he knew that his acts would
cause death or great bodily harm to __ ; or he knew that his
acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm
to __; or
Third: That the defendant was not justified in using the force which
he used.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one
of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you
should find the defendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one
of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
you should find the defendant not guilty.' 8
To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the State must prove
the following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death
of __; and
Second: That when the defendant did so, he intended to kill or
do great bodily harm to _ ; or he knew that his acts would
cause death or great bodily harm to __ ; or he knew that his
acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm
to __; and
Third: That when the defendant did so he believed that cir-
cumstances existed which would have justified killing; and
Fourth: That the defendant's belief that such circumstances existed
was unreasonable.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one
of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you
should find the defendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one
of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
you should find the defendant not guilty.89
A conscientious jury will notice that determining the existence beyond a
reasonable doubt of all the propositions necessary for murder will in no
way preclude an additional finding of guilty of voluntary manslaughter. If
a jury finds that the state proved the three elements of murder beyond a
reasonable doubt, and also determines that the defendant possessed an
unreasonable belief of justification, it should return two verdicts-guilty of
murder and guilty of voluntary manslaughter. This anomaly is caused by
the failure of the revised Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions to inform the
jury of the proper procedure for deliberation. This problem would be
eliminated by the adoption of the unified instruction proposed in this Article.
Until the pattern instructions are amended, however, a trial judge must
88. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL No. 7.02 & 24-25.06A (2d ed. 1981).
89. Id. at 7.06.
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determine which verdict to render when he is confronted with guilty verdicts
for both murder and voluntary manslaughter.9" The facile answer to the
judge's quandary is that the more-inclusive offense incorporates every ele-
ment of the lesser-included offense; therefore, the court should merely enter
a verdict for the more inclusive offense. 9 ' Because voluntary manslaughter
is undoubtedly a lesser-included offense of murder,92 so the answer goes,
the judge would enter judgment on the murder verdict.
The flaw in this reasoning, however, is that it confuses two different con-
cepts associated with the idea of lesser-included offenses. In the majority
of cases, lesser-included crimes share two characteristics: first, fewer elements
are needed to prove these offenses than to prove the more-inclusive offenses;
and second, lesser-included offenses are punished less severely than more-
inclusive offenses.93 Despite these general characteristics, the elimination of
"malice aforethought" by the Illinois legislature had a unique effect on the
relationship between murder and voluntary manslaughter-voluntary
manslaughter became "murder plus." The jury instructions make it clear
that voluntary manslaughter is composed of all the elements of murder plus
mitigating circumstances.94 Yet, because voluntary manslaughter requires a
less culpable mental state than murder, it is unquestionably a lesser-included
offense of murder.95 Thus, murder/voluntary manslaughter is the rare ex-
ample in which the offense which requires proof of a greater number of
elements is the less serious, lesser-included crime.
Interestingly, judicial recognition of the elimination of malice aforethought
90. The trial judge faced this situation in People v. Stuller, 71 111. App. 3d 118, 389 N.E.2d
593 (5th Dist. 1979). This situation arose because the instruction for murder erroneously failed
to include the section of the former Pattern Instruction informing the jury that to prove murder,
the State had the burden of proving that the defendant did not believe that circumstances ex-
isted which justified the use of deadly force. See ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL
7.02 & 25.05 (Ist ed. 1968). The trial judge entered judgment on the murder count. On appeal,
the decision was reversed and judgment was entered on the voluntary manslaughter count. The
appellate court reasoned that the defective instruction gave rise to plain error affecting substan-
tial rights. 71 Ill. App. 3d at 122, 389 N.E.2d at 596.
It should be noted that the 1981 edition of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions has eliminated
the requirement that where murder and unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter are both
in issue, the State can obtain a murder conviction only if it disproves voluntary manslaughter
beyond a reasonable doubt. See supra note 81.
91. See People v. Bailey, 391 Ill. 149, 154, 62 N.E.2d 796, 798-99 (1945); People v. Bell,
328 Ill. 446, 453, 159 N.E. 807, 810 (1928).
92. See People v. Pierce, 52 Il1. 2d 7, 11, 284 N.E.2d 279, 282 (1972); People v. Pratt,
44 III. 2d 96, 102, 262 N.E.2d 898, 900 (1970).
93. For example, robbery, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 18-1 (1981), is a Class 2 felony
while armed robbery, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 18-2 (1981), is a Class X felony.
94. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
95. The Code provides that an included offense is one that "[i]s established by proof of
the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable mental state (or both), than that which
is required to establish the commission of the offense charged." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
2-9 (a) (1981). Here the mitigation can be said in a broad sense to make the mental state
"less culpable."
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would solve the dilemma imposed on a judge when guilty verdicts on both
voluntary manslaughter and murder are returned. By returning a guilty ver-
dict on voluntary manslaughter, the jury indicates that it has found all of
the elements of murder plus the presence of mitigating circumstances. Thus,
when guilty verdicts of both murder and voluntary manslaughter are returned,
the judge should enter a judgment of guilty of voluntary manslaughter.96
This would ensure a just and accurate result.
CONCLUSION
The elimination of malice aforethought was a significant step in clarifying
homicide law in Illinois. Yet over twenty years later, this outmoded concept
continues to haunt the legal community. A proper starting point for correct-
ing the problem would be the revision of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions to reflect the correct relation between murder and voluntary
manslaughter in Illinois. It is time to finally lay to rest the concept of malice
aforethought. Surely "malice toward none" would guarantee "clarity for all."
96. See People v. Stuller, 71 111. App. 3d 118, 121-22, 389 N.E.2d 593, 595 (5th Dist. 1979);
People v. Taylor, 36 Ill. App. 3d 898, 900, 344 N.E.2d 742, 744 (1st Dist. 1976).
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